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Abstract 
The general theme of this paper is the issue of formaliza-
tion in philosophy; in a more specific way, it deals with 
the issue of formalization of arguments in analytic philo-
sophy of religion. One argument in particular – Anselm’s 
Proslogion II ontological argument – and one specific 
attempt to formalize it – Robert Adams’ formalization 
found in his paper “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s 
Arguments”, published in The Philosophical Review in 
1971 – are taken as study cases. The purpose of the paper 
is to critically analyze Adams’ formalization with the in-
tent to shed some light on the following questions: What 
are the virtues of formally analyzing arguments and the 
contributions, if any, of such an enterprise to the debate 
on Anselm’s argument? Which lessons can Adam’s work 
teach us about the dangers and limitations of formaliza-
tion? Do these virtues and dangers teach us something 
about analysis of arguments in general?
Key words: Formalization in philosophy. Theist arguments. 
Ontological argument. Anselm’s argument. Adams.
Resumo
O tema geral deste artigo é a questão da formalização 
em filosofia; de uma maneira mais específica, ele trata 
da questão da formalização de argumentos em filosofia 
analítica da religião. Um argumento em particular – o ar-
gumento ontológico de Anselmo encontrado no capítulo 
II do seu Proslógio – e uma tentativa específica de for-
maliza-lo – a formalização de Robert Adams encontrada 
em seu artigo “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s Argu-
ments”, publicado no The Philosophical Review em 1971 
– são tomados como estudos de caso. O objetivo do arti-
go é analisar criticamente a formalização de Adams com 
o propósito de lançar alguma luz nas seguintes questões: 
Quais são as virtudes de se analisar formalmente argu-
mentos e as contribuições de tal empreitada para o debate 
acerca do argumento de Anselmo? Que lições o trabalho 
de Adams pode nos dar sobre os perigos e limitações da 
formalização em filosofia? Essas virtudes e perigos nos 
ensinam algo sobre análise de argumentos em geral?
Palavras-chave: Formalização em filosofia. Argumentos 
teístas. Argumento ontológico. Argumento de Anselmo. 
Adams.
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Introduction
There has been recently a great deal of interest in the debate on the role of forma-
lization in philosophy. Authors such as Pascal Engel (2010), Sven Hansson (2000) and 
Leon Horsten and Igor Douven (2008) have made interesting contributions to this topic. 
Questions usually asked here are (1) “What are the virtues and dangers of formalization?” 
(2) “Which kind of work should precede the formalization proper?” and (3) “Which for-
mal tool is most suitable for a given philosophical problem?
It is not coincidence that this debate takes place in a moment where it is safe to 
say that the age of logical influence on analytic philosophy is gone. Except for isolated 
cases, the use that contemporary analytic philosophers make of logic is, in the absence 
of a better word, a ‘diluted’ one: by mostly using elementary logical tools, they neglect 
what mostly characterize modern logic, namely, its proof and model theoretical sides and 
meta-logical considerations. There are many reasons for this state of affairs. Surely one 
of them has to do with a criticism very often made against the use of formal tools in phi-
losophy: in general the formal philosopher gets so stuck in technicalities that he misses 
what really matters to the problem; at the end of the day it is hard to say what are his real 
contributions to the philosophical problem at hand. 
However and despite of this, construction and evaluation of arguments keeps being 
an important part of the work of any analytic philosopher. This seems to be particularly 
true for analytic philosophy of religion, where the construction and analysis of theistic 
and atheistic arguments has been for decades a flourishing field of inquire. Among other 
things, we find here – especially in the study of one of the most famous arguments in the 
philosophy of religion, and in fact in the whole history of philosophy: the ontological 
argument – some of those isolated cases I have mentioned before. 
It is not new that some very well-known contemporary versions of the ontological 
argument make use of a considerable amount of formal notation. I am here thinking of 
Kurt Gödel’s (1995) and Alvin Planting’s (1974) versions of the ontological argument. 
However, it is in the analysis of some traditional versions of the argument, particularly 
Anselm’s version, that we find some of the most interesting instances of logical forma-
lization in philosophy of religion. The works of Robert Adams (1971), Jonathan Barnes 
(1972), Paul Oppenheimer and Edward Zalta (1991), Gyula Klima (2000) and Jordan 
Sobel (2004) are examples of this.
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I will focus here on Robert Adams’ (1971) formalization of Anselm’s Proslogion II 
argument found in his paper “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s Arguments”, published 
in The Philosophical Review in 1971. More specifically, my goal is to critically analyze 
this work with the intent to shed some light on the following questions:
1) What are the virtues of formally analyzing arguments and the contributions, if 
any, of such an enterprise to the debate on Anselm’s argument?
2) Which lessons can Adam’s work teach us about the dangers and limitations of 
formalization?
3) Do these virtues and dangers teach us something about analysis of arguments in 
general?
Before getting into the analysis proper, I will say some few words about the use of 
logic in the analysis of philosophical arguments. I will also present a very rough analysis 
of Anselm’s argument that will help in the evaluation of Adams’ work.
1 Some considerations on  Logic-Formal Analysis in philosophy
Talk about the role of logical formal analysis of arguments presupposes an answer 
to the question of what a formal analysis of an existing argument is. Like many issues 
in formalization in philosophy, this is a disputable one. However, we might say there are 
some features common to all formal analysis of arguments. First, there is always some 
sort of previous, informal analysis of the argument; it is meant to say, for example, what 
the premises and conclusion of the argument are, whether or not there are subsidiary ar-
guments and hidden premises, etc. Second, there is a formal language in which premises 
and conclusion are represented. Third, there is some attempt to reconstruct the inferential 
steps of the original argument, that is to say, some sort of formal derivation from premises 
to conclusion usually is there. Finally, and this might be taken as an optional feature, there 
is an inference theory, be it proof theoretical or semantical, or both, inside of which the 
derivation is evaluated. 
This last point, although not always present in formalizations of arguments found 
in contemporary philosophy (that is why I have said it is optional), is a very important 
one. One of the main purposes of formalizing an existing argument is to better evaluate 
its soundness. Logic seems to be the ideal tool for this exactly because it is a theory of 
sound argumentation; one of its main purposes, we can say, is to provide a rigorous, more 
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trustful framework in which arguments can be evaluated. Although a formal analysis that 
stops, say, at the level of representing premises and conclusion into a formal language 
might shed some light on the structure and presuppositions of the argument, it misses the 
most important contribution that formal logic can give, which is a rigorous way to apprai-
se the soundness of arguments. 
In a sense, the whole thing can be seen from the viewpoint of Carnap’s (1950) pro-
ject of conceptual explanation. On one side, we have an argument, in general, presented 
in a prose text, whose relevant aspects – premises and conclusion with their exact me-
aning, presuppositions, structure, etc. – are obscure and ambiguous. This would corres-
pond to Carnap’s notion of explicandum. On the other hand we have the outcome of the 
analysis: a derivation, represented inside a formal framework, which is supposed to be a 
reconstruction, or to use Carnap’s terminology, an explanation of the original argument. 
This is the explicatum. 
Due to its formal feature, the explicatum is supposed not to have those obscure fea-
tures of the explicandum. In particular, it must be evident in the explicatum the exact me-
aning of premises, conclusion and hidden presuppositions, the structure of the argument, 
and whether or not it is a sound argument. The explicatum is also supposed to help in the 
evaluation of the reasonableness of the premises. Naturally, in order to be an explanation 
or, as we shall prefer, a reconstruction of the original argument, the explicatum should be 
minimally similar to the explicandum. Due to the very nature of a formal reconstruction 
and to the obscurity and incompleteness of informal arguments, the explicatum will have 
many elements not present in the original argument. However, this shall not make the 
explicatum to depart too much from the original argument, otherwise it cannot any more 
be said to be an explanation of it. 
2  Anselm’s Argument 
Anselm’s first and most famous ontological argument is found in the second chapter 
of his Proslogion (Anselm, 1965). Here we have the extract where the argument appears:
(i)  Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may 
understand, as much as You see fit, that You exist as we believe You to exist, 
and that You are what we believe You to be.
(ii) Now we believe that You are something than which nothing greater can be 
thought. 
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(iii) Or can it be that a thing of such a nature does not exist, since “the Fool has said 
in his heart, there is no God?” (Psalms14, l.1, and 53, l. 1.)
(iv) But surely, when this same Fool hears what I am talking about, namely, “so-
mething-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought”, he understands what 
he hears, and what he understands is in his mind (intellect, understanding), 
even if he does not understand that it actually exists.
(v) For it is one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to un-
derstand that an object actually exists. 
(vi) Thus, when a painter plans before hand what he is going to execute, he has (it) 
in his mind, but does not yet think that it actually exists because he has not yet 
executed it. 
(vii) However, when he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and 
understands that it exists because he has now made it.
(viii) Even the Fool, then, is forced to agree that something-than-which-nothing-
-greater-can-be-thought exists in the mind, since he understands this when he 
hears it, and whatever is understood is in the mind. 
(ix) And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the 
mind alone. 
(x) For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, 
which is greater. 
(xi) If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, 
this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than-which-a-
-greater-can-be-thought.
(xii) But this is obviously impossible.
(xiii) Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-
-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality2. 
Sentences (i) and (ii) might be seen as an introduction to the argument. While (i) is 
a sort of opening statement, (ii) is Anselm’s famous definition of God: God is something 
than which nothing greater can be thought. (iii) marks the proof style Anselm adopted: 
the reductio ad absurdum method; it states what we might call the reductio ad absurdum 
hypothesis, that is, the negation of what is supposed to be proved. Sentences (iv) to (viii) 
can be taken as a preliminary argument meant to prove a key premise of the argument: 
that something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought exists in the Fool’s mind. (ix) 
is an anticipation of the argument’s conclusion: that God exists both in reality and in the 
understanding. (x) is the basic step of the argument: if this thing exists only in the mind, it 
can be thought to exist in reality also, and to exist in reality is greater. Sentence (xi) states 
a consequence of what has been said so far, in special a consequence of the hypothesis 
2 Translation by M. J. Charlesworth (ANSELM, 1965).
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that this thing exists only in the mind: if it exists only in the mind, it will be at the same 
time that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought and that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-
-thought. But this, as sentence (xii) says, is impossible. Therefore the conclusion of the 
argument (xiii): that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in 
the mind and in reality.
3  Adams’ Formalization 
Robert Adams’ (1971) article “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s Arguments” of-
fers a formal analysis of Anselm’s arguments for the existence of God. After presenting 
the argument of Proslogion II in a formal fashion, Adams lays down a couple of assump-
tions about existence and predication on which the argument seems to him to depend. He 
then tries to formally show how Gaunilo’s famous lost island counterexample proves that 
these assumptions must be modified. Besides, he analyzes one of the arguments for the 
existence of God found in Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, which, according to him, does not 
depend on those assumptions; he also analyzes Anselm’s ontological argument found in 
chapter III of Proslogion.
Here I will be concerned only with Adams’ formalization of Anselm’s Proslogion 
II argument, his assumptions about existence and predication and his formalization of 
Gaunilo’s counter example. 
Before presenting his formalization, Adams does a short informal analysis of the 
original argument; according to him, Anselm’s argument has the following three senten-
ces as premises:
(I)  There is, in the understanding at least, something than which nothing greater 
can be thought;
(II) If it is even in the understanding alone, it can be thought to be in reality also;
(III) which is greater;
and the sentence below as conclusion:
(IV) There exists, therefore, . . . both in the understanding and in reality, something 
than which a greater cannot be thought
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As far as our numeration of Ansem’s statements is concerned, (I) is sentence (viii), (II) 
and (III) are (x), and (IV) is sentence (xiii). 
The first observation to be made about Adams’s analysis concerns his choice of 
taking (viii) as premise. As we have said, sentences from (iv) to (viii) can be taken very 
reasonably as a preliminary argument: while (iv) is an anticipation of the conclusion 
and (viii) is the conclusion, sentences (v) to (vii) seem to be meant to support (viii). 
That Adams skips this and takes (viii) instead as premise is significant for a couple of 
reasons. First, although one could try to justify this move, the fact that Adams does not 
even mention it and simply ignores a good part of Anselm’s original argument makes his 
analysis less faithful to it. Second, neglecting that Anselm himself tried to justify (viii) 
has important consequences for evaluating the reasonableness of (Adam’s reconstruction 
of) Anselm’s argument. As we know, many people, such as William Rowe (2006, p. 37-
52), have argued that this premise is a very key one in the argument, and unless it is well 
justified, the argument might be accused of question-begging. 
The second thing is that there is in Adams analysis a fourth premise which he men-
tions just at the time of formally reconstructing Anselm’s argument:
(V) There is no God.
It corresponds to sentence (iii). The reason why he had to wait that long has to do 
with the poof method Anselm uses: the reductio ad absurdum method.
Adams uses a first-order language to represent premises and conclusion. However, 
he interprets the definition of God in a modal fashion, using a modal operator and going, 
in this way, beyond the walls of classical first-order logic. He uses two unary predicates 
– U and R –, and two binary ones: G and Q, meaning as follows:
U(x) x exists in the understanding 
R(x) x exists in reality
G(x,y) x is greater than y
Q(x,y) x is the magnitude of y
Besides, as we said, he also uses a modal operator, M, which means “it can be thought 
that” or “it is possible that”, which he takes as equivalent. From now on I will read M as 
“it is possible that”; later I shall comment on Adam’s taking “it can be thought that” and 
“it is possible that” as equivalent.
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In order to formally represent the premises, Adams uses the following abbreviation:
f(x,m) =
def
 Q(m,x)∧¬M($y$n(G(n,m)∧Q(n,y))
f(x,m) is a representation of Anselm’s concept of a thing than which nothing greater can be 
thought. Besides using variable x to mean that thing, Adams uses one more free variable, m, 
to represent the magnitude of x. What f(x,m) says is that m is the magnitude of x, and it is 
not possible that there is another thing, say y, whose magnitude n is greater than m.
The formal representation of the three premises and conclusion of the argument is 
as follows:
(I) $x$m(U(x)∧f(x,m)) 
(II) ∀x∀m(U(x)∧f(x,m)→MR(x))
(III) ∀x∀m(f(x,m)∧¬R(x)→¬M¬(R(x)→$n(G(n,m)∧Q(n,x))))
(IV) $x$m(U(x)∧R(x)∧f(x,m))
(I), (II) and (IV) are of easy understanding. (III) says that to every x and m, if x is God 
and m is his magnitude, but he does not exist in reality, then it is not possible that the 
following proposition is false (that is to say, such a proposition is necessary): if x exists in 
reality, then his new magnitude, n, is greater than m. Adopting a counterfactual reading, 
(III) would mean the following: if God, whose magnitude is m, does not exist in reality, 
then would he exist in reality, his new magnitude, n, would be greater than m.
(III) incorporates one of the most controversial issues in Anselm’s argument: the 
doctrine that existence is a perfection. The doctrine appears in sentence (x) of Anselm’s 
argument:
(x) For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, 
which is greater.
, which Adams represents as his (incomplete) informal premise (III). Now, this principle, 
which can be described as the presupposition that
(G) It is greater to exist in reality as well than to exist merely in the understanding
, might be understood in at least three different ways (Matthews, 2005, pp. 90-91):
(G1) Anything that exists both in reality and in the understanding is greater than 
anything that exists in the understanding alone.
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(G2) Anything that exists both in reality and in the understanding is greater than the 
otherwise same kind of thing that exists in the understanding alone.
(G3) Anything that exists both in the understanding and in reality is greater than the 
otherwise exact same thing, if that thing exists merely in the understanding.
Adams, who is partially aware of this ambiguity –
All Anselm said was “which is greater.” This could be taken to mean that anything which 
exists in reality is greater than anything which does not; this is a claim to which Anselm 
would probably have assented. But it could also mean just that the being under discussion 
(that than which nothing greater can be thought) would be greater if it existed than if not; 
this is all the argument requires, and I am assuming this minimal interpretation in symboli-
zing the argument. (Adams, 1974, p. 30)
– picks (G3) as the correct or more suitable interpretation of (G). However, even consi-
dering its attempt to be as precise as possible, G3 is still ambiguous with respect to one 
thing: are these two things we are comparing exactly the same object, or two objects whi-
ch differ in one aspect only (existence)? Adams representation leaves no doubt: we are 
comparing the very and same object, the one referred to by variable x.
A second point I should mention regarding (III) is Adams’ use of the operator M. 
Sure it is an interesting way to incorporate in (III) the doctrine that existence is a perfec-
tion. However, it is significant that neither Anselm’s original statement of it in (x) nor (G) 
use any kind of modal construction.  It is a theoretical choice Adams does with no trivial 
support in Anselm’s text. And, similarly to his use of (viii) as premise, there is no attempt 
to justify this important theoretical movement. Besides the philosophical implications 
of writing (G) in this way, it is crucial for one of the main purposes of Adams’ work; as 
well shall see below, the validity of the formal reconstruction of Anselm’s argument he 
presents is formally linked with the use of M in (III). 
Adams then proceeds to show that Anselm’s argument, or to be more precise, his 
reconstruction of Anselm’s argument, is sound. He constructs a derivation using a couple 
of well-known classical first-order inference rules of Quine’s book Methods of Logic. He 
also uses two modal inferences:
M1. ¬M¬(a→b), Ma  Mb
M2. $xMa(x)  M$xa(x)
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Differently however from his use of classical first-order rules, he does not state 
which modal formal system he is using. Despite of this, his reconstruction of Anselm’s 
argument seems to be sound. Besides these two inferences, he also uses the following first 
order inferences rules (here we are using a more standard notation than Quine’s):
C1. $xa(x)  a(x/t)
C2.  ∀xa(x)  a(x/t)
C3. a∧b, b∧j→l  j→l
C4.  a(t)  $xa(t/x)
C5. a∧b, j  b∧j
C6. If G, a  b then G  a→b
C7. ¬a→b∧¬b  a
C8.   a∧b, j a∧j∧b
MP. a, a→b  b
Here is the derivation:
1. $x$m(U(x)∧f(x,m))       Pr. (I)
2. ∀x∀m(U(x)∧f(x,m)→MR(x))     Pr. (II)
3. ∀x∀m(f(x,m)∧¬R(x)→¬M¬(R(x)→$n(G(n,m)∧Q(n,x)))) Pr. (III)
4. U(a)∧f(a,b)       C1 1
5. U(a)∧f(a,b)→MR(a)      C2 2
6. MR(a)        MP 5,4
7. f(a,b)∧¬R(a)→¬M¬(R(a)→$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,a)))  C2 3
8. ¬R(a)→¬M¬(R(a)→$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,a)))   C3 4,7
*9.  ¬R(a)        Pr. (V)
*10. ¬M¬(R(a)→$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,a)))     MP 8,9
*11. M$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,a))      M1 6,10
*12. $yM$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,y))      C4 11
*13. M$y$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,y))      M2 12
*14. U(a)∧Q(b,a)∧¬M$y$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,y))     4
*15. M$y$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,y))∧¬M$y$x(G(n,b)∧Q(n,y))  C5 13,14
16. ¬R(a)→ M$y$n(G(n,b)∧Q(n,y))∧¬M$y$x(G(n,b)∧Q(n,y)) C6 
17. R(a)        C7 16
18.  U(a)∧R(a)∧f(a,b)       C8 4,17
19. $x$m(U(x)∧R(x)∧f(x,m))     C4 18
A couple of things have to be mentioned about this reconstruction of Anselm’s argument. 
First, it is exactly this: a reconstruction. Trivially Anselm’s argument does not have this structu-
re; at no point of his text we find evidence for most of the steps and inference rules that Adams 
uses. It is a reconstruction in the sense of revealing the logic beyond Anselm’s argument or 
unclosing all otherwise hidden logical steps needed to turn Anselm’s argument into a sound one. 
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Despite of this, and this is the second point, Adams correctly represents two impor-
tant structural features of Anselm’s argument. First, starting from step 9, it uses the reduc-
tio ad absurdum method we found in the original argument (it ends at 15). Second, An-
selm’s original argument switches back and forth from a universal discourse to talk about 
particulars. From (iv) to (viii) he speaks about something than which nothing greater can 
be thought; however, from (ix) to (xii) he changes his discourse and starts speaking about 
that than which a greater cannot be thought; then, in (xiii), he goes back to talk about 
something than which nothing greater can be thought. Adams correctly represents this 
movement. Using C1 and C2, he switches, in steps 4, 5 and 7, from a universal discourse 
to discourse about particulars (in the case, individuals a and b). Similarly to Anselm’s 
original argument, all crucial reductio ad absurdum steps are done inside this particular 
discourse framework. Then, when he has proved that a exists in reality, he goes back in 
step 19, thought C4, to the universal type of discourse.
Third, Adams uses a somehow incomplete calculus: the first-order part is ok, but he 
does not say from which calculus he draws his modal inferences. Consequently, we do not 
know which semantics might be associated with it (since there are many modal systems), 
neither if the resulting system with a specific semantics would be sound and complete. 
Finally, we can here appreciate better the consequences of taking “it can be thought 
that” as equivalent to “it is possible that”. Trivially, the soundness of this reconstruction 
depends on the soundness of the modal inferences he uses. That they are sound when 
interpreting M as “it is possible that” is not a big issue. But how about Adams’ interpre-
tation? Is the soundness of these modal inferences automatically transferred when one 
interprets M as “it can be thought that”? It is somehow ad hoc to arbitrarily assume that 
this question can be answered with a “yes”.
After this, Adams states what he takes as one of the main goals of his article: “What 
I do want to discuss are certain general principles about existence and predication which 
are presupposed in the formulation and assertion of the premises of the Proslogion 2 ar-
gument.” (Adams, 1971, p. 32). They are five in number: 
(1)  That predication does not presuppose real existence;
(2)  That (contrary to Meinong’s ontology) the universe of discourse does not in-
clude objects with contradictory predicates;
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(3)  That a thing which exists in the understanding truly possesses all the proper-
ties which are contained or implied in its concept or definition;
(4)  That one and the same thing can exist both in the understanding and in reality;
(5)  That existence and nonexistence in reality and existence in the understanding 
are predicates or properties.
Since Adam’s other stated goal is to “offer a formal analysis of Anselm’s arguments 
for the existence of God in the Proslogion […]” (Adams, 1971, p. 28), we might wonder 
about the relations that are between those five principles and the formal work done so far. 
Well, most of these principles are well-known and do not seem at all to depend on any 
kind of formalization. However, some of them bear very interesting relations with the 
whole idea of formally analyzing Anselm’s argument. 
First, that predication does not presuppose real existence (1) implies that, in a first-
-order semantic framework, the objects belonging to the domain D must include, beyond 
real objects, also unreal objects. Adams is clear about that:
In terms of the predicate calculus used in my formalization of the argument, this means 
that the universe of discourse over which the variables range is not restricted to things that 
exist in reality. Obviously, if the universe of discourse were assumed to include only real 
things, the first step of the argument could not without circularity be asserted as a premise. 
(Adams, 1929, p. 33)
What we have here is an interpretation of a particular aspect of the semantics forced 
by the peculiarly of the problem at hand. On the other way round, we can say that this fe-
ature of the domain D helps in clarifying (1), making it somehow more precise. Trivially, 
such a use of first-order semantics implies (1). 
Second, it not hard to see that (2) is an intrinsic feature of classical first-order se-
mantics. Therefore, similarly to what we have said about (1) above, the intolerance to 
contradictions of classical first-order logic implies the truth of (2). So, we can say that, in 
this respect, Adams picked up the right representational tool3. 
Third, more than any other of Adams’ five principles, (5) is closely connected with 
his formulation. Since he formalizes the two kinds of existence (in the understanding 
and in reality) as predicate symbols of the logical language, it is natural that he takes this 
principle as one which is presupposed by the argument. But to what extent this applies to 
3 It must be said, however, that in other logics, such as paraconsistent logics, there might be objects with 
contradictory properties. So, this is a reinforcement of the point that Anselm’s logic is classical in this sense.
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Anselm’s formulation? Naturally, Anselm uses the notions of existence in the understan-
ding and existence in reality. But, does he see them as predicates or properties, as Adams 
seems to claim? In order to appreciate this better, let us take a look at something very 
closely connected with this issue: Kant’s famous “being is not a property” critique to the 
ontological argument. 
Although originally directed towards Descartes’ ontological argument, Kant’s ob-
jection has been often seen as an objection against Anselm’s version. Trivially enough, it 
is an objection against Adam’s formalization of Anselm’s argument. But is it a genuine 
objection against Anselm’s formulation? Some would say that it is not. Here it is Kant’s 
relevant statement:
By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing – even if we comple-
tely determine it – we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare 
that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but some-
thing more than we had thought in the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the 
exact object of my concept exists. (Kant, 1929, p. 505)
This criticism does not exactly fit Anselm’s statement of his argument. As Gareth 
Matthews has put it:
He does [Anselm] not speak of adding the concept of existence, or even the concept of 
existence in reality, to the concept of God, or the concept of something than which nothing 
greater can be thought. What he does instead is to ask us to compare something existing me-
rely in the understanding with something existing in reality as well. And the second, he says, is 
greater. (Matthews, 2005, p. 90)
So, it is not clear at all that, for Anselm’s formulation, existence is a predicate. 
At this point we can better appreciate the impact of one’s formulation in the logical 
analysis of an argument. Since Adams represents the concepts of existence in reality and 
existence in the understanding with the help of logical predicates, his formulation natu-
rally presupposes (5). But the same cannot indisputably be said about Anselm’s formu-
lation. In fact, while Anselm’s formulation is at least defensible against Kant’s critique, 
Adam’s is not. 
It is important to keep in mind that the choice of representing the two existence 
concepts as logical predicates is exactly this: a technical choice. Many formalizations of 
Anselm’s argument represent at least one of the concepts with the help of the existential 
quantifier. And in fact, it is not difficult to conceive an alternative version of Adam’s formaliza-
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tion which represents none of the two existence concepts as properties. In order to illustrate this 
point, let us give a rough sketch of what this version would look like.
First we have to build an expanded first-order logic with two existential quantifiers, 
say, $ and ∋. While $ is a broad quantifier ranging over a large domain D, ∋ is a more 
restricted one ranging over domain D’⊆D. As far as Anselm’s argument is concerned, D 
contains all objects, be them located in reality or in the understanding (it does not matter 
here who’s understanding); D’ contains only objects located in reality. Therefore, while 
$xP(x) means that x exists in reality or in the understanding and has property x, ∋xP(x) 
means that x exists in reality and has property P. Given this, we have two abbreviations:
f(x,m) =
def
 Q(m,x)∧¬M($y$n(G(n,m)∧Q(n,y))
e(x,m) =
def
 ∋y$n(f(y,n)∧(y=x)∧(n=m))
f is the same as Adam’s abbreviation. e(x,m) means that x is God and he exists in reality. 
The premises and conclusion are then represented as follows:
(I) $x$y(f(x,m)) 
(II) ∀x∀m(f(x,m)→M(e(x,m))
(III) ∀x∀m(f(x,m)∧¬e(x,m)→¬M¬(e(x,m)→$n(G(n,m)∧Q(n,x))))
(IV) ∋x$m(f(x,m))
This simple exercise is meant just to show the impact of one’s technical choices 
in the formalization of an argument. By using a different representational tool, we not 
only showed that (5) is not a presupposition of Anselm’s argument per se, but of Adams’ 
formulation of it, but also got rid of Kant’s famous criticism. The same can be said about 
Frege’s related criticism that existence is a property of concepts, not of the objects which 
fall under the concept. 
After stating those five principles, Adams goes on to formalize Gaunilo’s famous 
lost island counter-example. His stated purpose with this was, first, to analyze the sound-
ness of such an argument, and second, show that its premises also depend on the five prin-
ciples on existence and predication which according to him Anselm’s depend on. According 
to Adams, “The counterexample of the lost island shows quite clearly that assumptions (i-v) 
must be rejected or at least modified” (Adams, 1971, p. 34)
In order to formalize Gaunilo’s counter-argument, Adams uses the following pre-
dicates:
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I(x)  x is an island 
L(x)  x is a land or country
P(x)  x has the profitable and delightful features attributed by legend to the lost 
island
The premises of the argument, already formalized, are as follows:
P1. $x(U(x)∧I(x)∧P(x)∧¬$y(L(y)∧G(y,x)))
P2. $x(L(x)∧R(x))
P3. ∀x∀y(L(x)∧R(x)∧I(y)∧¬R(y)→G(x,y))
The conclusion is
C.  $x(U(x)∧R(x)∧I(x)∧P(x)∧¬$y(L(y)∧G(y,x)))
P1 means that there is an individual x which exists in the understanding, is an is-
land, has the profitable and delightful features attributed by legend to the lost island and, 
besides, there is no land greater than it. P2 simply says that there exists a real land. P3 
says that any real land is greater than any island which does not exist in reality. The con-
clusion says that there exist such an island, both in the understanding and in reality, and 
that there is no greater land.
As we can see, the formalization of Gaunilo’s premises and conclusion is simpler 
than the formalization of Anselm’s argument: the predicate Q is not used, nor is the modal 
operator M. Adams’ reconstruction of Gaunilo’s argument is also simpler, although it uses 
the following extra inference rules:
C9. s1∧b∧s2, a, a∧b∧l→j  l→j
Here is the derivation:
1. $x(U(x)∧I(x)∧P(x)∧¬$y(Ly∧G(y,x)))   P1
2. $x(L(x)∧R(x))      P2
3. ∀x∀y(L(x)∧R(x)∧I(y)∧¬R(y)→G(x,y))   P3
4. U(b)∧I(b)∧P(b)∧¬$y(L(y)∧G(y,b)    C1 1
5. L(a)∧R(a)       C1 2
6. L(a)∧R(a)∧I(b)∧¬R(b)→G(a,b)    C2 3
7. ¬R(b)→G(a,b)      C9 4,5,6
*8. ¬R(b)        Pr.
*9.  G(a,b)        MP 8,7
*10. L(a)∧G(a,b)       C5 5,9
*11. $y(L(y)∧G(y,b))      C4 10
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião /  Brasília /  v.2 n.2 / p 142-161 / dez. 2015 / ISSN 2352-8284 157
On the logical formalization of Anselm’s ontological argument
*12. $y(L(y)∧G(y,b))∧¬$y(L(y)∧G(y,b)    C5 4,11
13. ¬R(b)→$y(L(y)∧G(y,b))∧¬$y(L(y)∧G(y,b)   C6 8,12
14. R(b)         C7 13
15. U(b)∧R(b)∧I(b)∧P(b)∧¬$y(L(y)∧G(y,b))   C8 4,14
16. $x(U(x)∧R(x)∧I(x)∧P(x)∧¬$y(L(y)∧G(y,x)))  C4 15
It is a sound argument. And despite the similarities (both proofs use the reductio 
ad absurdum method and the universal-to-particular-to-universal movement), it is pretty 
clear that both arguments have a quite different structure. In fact, the structure departure 
starts from the logical form of the premises: whereas Anselm spoke of a being whose 
greatness could not possibly be surpassed, Gaunilo speaks only of an island to which no 
country is in fact superior. 
Given this, it is clear that Gaunilo’s argument fails as a counter-argument to An-
selm’s Proslogion II argument. Traditionally, a counter-argument in this sense is an argu-
ment that shares the same logical structure of another argument, has true or reasonable 
premises, but an absurd or patently false conclusion. In this way, since we cannot accept 
the conclusion of the counter-argument, we cannot accept the conclusion of the original 
argument either: despite its apparent soundness, there must be something wrong with the 
argument (although this method of refutation does not say what is wrong). It seems that 
Gaunilo intended his counter argument to function as a refutation of Anselm’s ontological 
argument in this sense. But since according to Adams’ reconstructions both arguments 
have a quite different structure, Gaunilo does not succeed in refuting Anselm’s argument 
this sense4.
4 Concluding Remarks
Let us see now what we have got from this brief analysis of Adams’ formalization 
of Anselm’ argument. 
About the pros of formalization and its contributions to the debate on Anselm’s ar-
gument, I would first point out that the use of a formal logical language such as first-order 
predicate language has a very interesting impact in the analysis of an argument. Besides 
anything else, this has to do with the level of detail shown in the representation of sen-
tences offered by a formal language. Due to this, it was possible to incorporate in (III) a 
very precise version of (G) and (G3). I order to see the importance of this disambiguation 
4 Despite of this, Adams insists that it is still a powerful criticism, for the reasonableness of its premises 
depend, like Anselm’s argument, on the truthfulness of the five presuppositions.
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one must just recall that Gaunilo attributed to Anselm the assumption that whatever exists 
in reality is greater than anything that does not. Something very alike seems to be behind 
Norman Malcolm’s criticism of the doctrine that existence is a perfection:
The doctrine that existence is a perfection is remarkably queer. It makes sense and is true 
to say that my future house will be a better one if it is insulated than if it is not insulated; 
but what could it mean to say that it will be a better house if it exists than if it does not? 
(Malcolm, 1960, p. 43)
Malcolm took himself to be restating the criticism of Anselm’s argument found in 
Kant which we mentioned earlier. But what the argument, according to Adams’ recons-
truction, needs is not a principle comparing concepts, but one which compares objects 
existing in the understanding. 
Second, by using a proof theory, it is possible to reveal crucial aspects of the ar-
gument at hand, including its logical structure and soundness. As an instance of this, we 
have Adams’ reconstruction incorporating two important aspects of the proof method An-
selm used: the reductio ad absurdum method and the movement he does, back and forth, 
from a universal discourse to discourse about particulars. Thanks also to this and to his 
reconstruction of Gaunilo’s argument, it was possible to show that Gaunilo’s argument is 
not a counter-argument of Anselm’s argument, at least not in the logical sense of the expression 
“counter-argument”, although Adams does not mention this.
Third, the use of a formal framework allows one to better state in, a more precise 
way, his analysis as a whole. For instance, Adams principles (1) that predication does not 
presuppose real existence and that (2) the universe of discourse does not include objects 
with contradictory predicates find a match in first-order semantics. Since Adams repre-
sents God with the help of variables, semantically it will correspond to an object belon-
ging to the semantic domain. And since there can be objects not satisfying the property 
corresponding to the predicate R, (1) automatically follows. Also, that there cannot be an 
object a∈D having and not having the same property is a feature of first-order semantics; 
therefore (2). 
About the dangers of formalization and Adams’ drawbacks, it should first be men-
tioned that Adam’s reconstruction is not quite faithful to Anselm’s original formulation. 
Although it incorporates many important elements of the original formulation, it departs 
from the original argument in some important points. Adams simply ignores that Anselm 
did give an argument for premise (viii): as we saw, there is a pretty clear preliminary argu-
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ment in Anselm’s text meant to support (viii). This negligence, as we saw, has important 
consequences for the rest of Adams’ formal analysis. Although any formalization of an 
argument has in some degree to depart from the original formulation, if the departure is 
too much, and mainly, if the departure points are not well justified, it is hard to see how 
the formal argument at hand might be taken as a formalization of the original argument. 
As such, it simply misses the whole purpose of logical formalization. 
A second but related point is that Adams makes a couple of important theoretical 
choices without justification. He equates “it can be thought that” with “it is possible that” 
with no attempt to justify it. He also represents premise (x) with the help of a modal 
operator which does appear at all in Anselm’s text. As we have mentioned, these choices 
are crucial for the rest of this formal work. Although these choices also make Adams’ 
formalization to depart from the original formulation, they are not as serious as the point 
mentioned above. However, the lack of justification for these movements is a serious is-
sue. For example, by representing “it is possible that” with the help of modal operator M 
and making reference to modal inferences characteristic of modal systems, he is unjusti-
fiably assuming that all the formal explanation given to the concept of possibility can be 
trivially transferred to the concept of conceivability. 
As in any formal reconstruction, Adams had to add elements not present in the ori-
ginal argument. The several steps of his formal argument clearly show that. In order to 
show the validity of an argument, proof theory requires a level of detail that no argument 
written in ordinary language could provide. Therefore, inevitably there will be elements 
foreign to the original formulation. The point which Adams seems to miss is that, since 
there are quite a number of directions to follow in the choice of these elements, whatever 
direction one picks has to be well justified. 
Third, the fact that Adams does not use a full formal logical machinery is trouble-
some. As we have said, one of the main purposes of formally analyzing an argument is 
to be able to critically evaluate the argument inside a somehow more trustful framework. 
However, Adams does not do so. Since he relies on an incomplete logical system, some 
of the grounds on which we will rely to appraise the soundness of his reconstruction will 
be pretty much alike to any informal analysis. 
Finally, about the relation between formal analysis and analysis in general, through 
this brief examination of Adam’s work we could see that there is a strong link between 
Ricardo Sousa Silvestre 
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião /  Brasília /  v.2 n.2 / p 142-161 / dez. 2015 / ISSN 2352-8284 160
the features of the formalization and the evaluation and analysis we make of the formali-
zed argument. This is illustrated by Adam’s principle (5) and his use of two predicates to 
represent the concepts of existence in reality and existence in the understanding. Surely 
this is a serious drawback of Adam’s formalization: by introducing an element which was 
absent from Anselm’s original formulation, he made the argument susceptible to Kant’s 
and Frege’s criticism. However, our sketch of a version of Adams’ formalization which 
is free from such criticisms shows the dependence of one’s evaluation and analysis of 
Anselm’ argument on the formal choices he or she makes in the process of formalizing it. 
And this point applies to any deep analysis of an argument, be it formal or not. As soon as 
we start an analysis of an argument which involves representing premises and conclusion 
in a more detailed way than is found in the original formulation, we have to make choices 
that most probably will influence the evaluation of the (reconstructed) argument.
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